Measuring the Quality of Banking Regulation in Egypt by Silvia Rashad Gad Tadros
      






Working Paper Series 
 
Measuring the Quality of Banking 
Regulation in Egypt 
 
by 
Silvia Rashad Gad Tadros 
  
Faculty of Management Technology 
German University in Cairo 
Al Tagamoa Al Khames 














The free market economy most countries pursue nowadays is never entirely 
free from government intervention. Policy makers devote special attention 
to the regulation of financial markets and with the current financial crisis, 
the quality of the banking regulations need to be reconsidered. This paper 
aims to provide a tool to measure the quality of banking regulation and 
supervision. This is usually a difficult task because it is a qualitative analysis 
and is arbitrary. However, a regulation index has been modelled that is 
similar to the concept of a cost-benefit analysis. The input index resembles 
the cost signifying the efforts made by governments and supervisors to 
measure the intensity of the regulation. The output index resembles the 
benefit which shows the outcome of the governments’ efforts. Finally, 
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1. Introduction 
  Having a healthy banking system is an issue of concern for every economy that 
wants to develop and prosper. This concern stems from the important role of banks in 
financial intermediation and their ability to deal with transaction and information costs 
thereby achieving financial and economic stability and leading to economic growth. Since 
banks are so vital to the economy, they are usually not allowed to operate freely. It is 
necessary to have them abide by regulations, which is a wide range of policies and rules 
that govern the behavior of banks, to ensure that they are not taking on excessive risks and 
that they are able to maintain depositors’ confidence in the banking system thus avoiding 
bank runs and bank failures. When talking about banking regulation, it is indispensable to 
refer to banking supervision which is the enforcement procedures that take place to ensure 
that banks are complying with the regulations.
1  
Since banks account for a major part of the financial sector, banks’ performance is 
a main driving force for the development of the financial sector and the economic 
performance as a whole. Banks’ role in the intermediation and efficient allocation of funds 
is based on the depositors’ confidence in the banking system's ability to pay their funds 
back. If people lose that confidence, bank failures may occur and financial and economic 
crises may result.
2 This is why banks, unlike business firms, are subject to a number of 
legal and regulatory restrictions. “These constraints are imposed because banks are 
considered too vital to the welfare of the economy to be permitted to operate freely under 
the law of supply and demand”. The failure of a firm or a bank will harm the owners, 
employees, creditors and customers. But banks not only have a much greater number of 
creditors / customers but they also do not really consider themselves creditors but view the 
bank as the riskless safe keeper of their wealth. Only the large depositors examine and 
evaluate the financial statements of their banks. This means that bank failure is far more 
harmful to the citizens and the economy than the failure of any other type of business and 
this is a main reason why banks need to be under regulation and supervision.
3  
                                                 
1   Barth (2006, p.4) 
2   Neyapti (2005, p. 80 f) 
3   Kaufman (1977, p. 102 f)  
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The world’s current financial crisis, which is the most severe since the great 
depression of 1929 is a proof of the importance of having a sound banking system on the 
performance of the world economy. The crisis is a natural consequence of the leniency in 
enforcing the necessary bank regulations. This paper does not directly address the current 
financial crisis where the world’s largest financial markets are experiencing unprecedented 
volatility and the world’s strongest economies are heading for severe recessions.
4 
However, amid this crisis, bank regulation and supervision are becoming red hot topics of 
high interest because it is necessary to look back to the rules and regulations to analyze 
them and find out what went wrong. This is vital to prevent the re-occurrence of such 
crisis.  
This paper starts with highlighting the importance of banks; explaining their three 
important tasks and showing how well they deal with information and transaction costs. 
The core of this paper then, introduces a simple regulation index that can be used to 
quantify and measure the quality of banking regulations. It measures the intensity of 
regulations in a given country in a given period of time and the corresponding 
effectiveness and performance of the banking system following the regulations. This index 
is developed with reference to the study of Neyapti, Dincer (2005). However, a gap 
existed in applying such an index to Egypt and therefore, this paper is enriched by its last 
section which includes an application of the regulation index to the Egyptian banking 
sector comparing its performance before and after the banking reform of year 2003.  
 
 
                                                 
4   The Economist (2008, Developed Economies Over the Edge)  
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2. The Importance and Roles of Commercial Banks 
“Commercial banks are the largest, most important, and most diversified of all 
financial intermediaries.”
5 They collect savings from surplus spending units (SSUs) and 
direct the funds to deficit spending units (DSUs). Commercial banks raise funds mainly by 
accepting savings and time deposits. These are the bank’s liabilities as the bank has to pay 
these funds back to the SSUs with interest. Commercial banks use the funds to give 
different types of loans which are considered the banks’ assets. A commercial bank is a 
profit making firm that earns profit by charging an interest on loans that is higher than the 
interest it pays on the deposits.
6 
  Financial intermediaries and commercial banks in specific have become so vital in 
the financial sector because they engage in three very important tasks:
7  
1)  Denomination / Volume Intermediation: 
The need for volume intermediation exists because DSUs are likely to demand 
higher volumes of funding than the volumes SSUs are willing to give.  
2)  Maturity Intermediation:
 8 
The need for maturity intermediation exists because DSUs usually need loans with 
longer maturities (later payback) than the period SSUs are willing to leave their funds for. 
This maturity problem can exist even when the volume compatibility problem is solved.  
3)  Risk Intermediation:  
Since a typical lender is risk averse, risk intermediation can be regarded as one of 
the most important tasks banks engage in and could be even considered a reason for bank 
existence. Due to their large size, banks are able to diversify and lend loans to different 
                                                 
5   For simplicity, I will use commercial banks or financial intermediaries interchangeably 
6   Ritter (1993, p. 39 f) 
7   Kaufman (1977, p.59) 
8   Bebczuk (2003, p.77 f)  
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firms in different sectors. This is beneficial because failures in some sectors can be 
compensated by the gains of other sectors. The ability to diversify is an advantage that 
requires professional experience and large scale that are not usually available to individual 
lenders. 
9 Banks are also more experienced in analyzing the credit risk of their borrowers 
and can accordingly adjust the interest rate it charges them. This makes banks better risk 
bearers and makes SSUs prefer using banks as financial intermediaries rather than 
investing directly.  
The importance of financial intermediaries also stems from their ability to deal 
better with transaction and information costs than individuals can on their own. 
Transaction costs are “the time and money spent in carrying out financial 
transactions.” Commercial banks can significantly reduce transaction costs because they 
bundle the funds of many investors together and so, their large size allows them to take 
advantage of economies of scale (the reduction in transaction costs per transaction as the 
number of transactions increases). Economies of scale in financial markets exist because 
the total cost of carrying out a transaction increases by less than the size of the transaction 
growth. 
10 Therefore, it could be unprofitable for an individual to carry out small 
transactions on his own since the return might not cover or only slightly cover the 
transaction costs involved.  
Information is expensive to gather and use. “Information costs include the 
assessment of the project and the entrepreneur, and monitoring during the time span of the 
contract”. Information costs exist due to the presence of asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information has two main forms: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. 
Adverse selection is a form of asymmetric information that, as the name suggests, 
occurs in the selection process of a contract before the transaction takes place, i.e. money 
is still with the lender. It exists because the borrower holds private information before the 
relationship is begun and will only reveal it to the lender if it is in his/her interest. This 
                                                 
9   Bebczuk (2003, p.77 f) 
10   Mishkin (2006, p.29ff & 173)  
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leaves the lender at an information disadvantage having the risk that the funds given to the 
borrower might not be paid back. 
11 This increases the probability of selecting a bad credit 
leading to insecurity in the financial market because the risk of default becomes higher. 
Consequently, adverse selection makes lenders reluctant to give out loans at all even 
though there are some good credits in the market and by time, those good credits will also 
disappear.
 12 However, banks have become experts in screening potential borrowers and in 
the production of information about their credit worthiness. This enables them to 
distinguish good credits from bad ones. Banks often use credit ratings
13 to evaluate the 
credit risk of a potential borrower and decide on the interest rate to charge accordingly. 
This screening process makes lenders feel safe and guarantees that their money will be 
paid back making them more open to lending.  
Moral hazard is another form of asymmetric information which occurs after the 
transaction takes place, i.e. money already with the borrower. This means that both parties 
have the same level of information at the beginning of the relationship but once the 
contract has been signed, the lender is not able to fully observe the borrower and 
consequently becomes at an information disadvantage. 
14 In the financial context, this 
means that the borrower invests in a different project than the one agreed upon with the 
lender. Since borrowers are using someone else’s money, they are tempted to engage in 
immoral / riskier projects, i.e. projects that will yield higher return if they succeed but 
have a higher probability of failure / default. However, banks have restrictive provisions in 
their loan contracts to limit borrowers from engaging in risky activities. This is a good 
means of control over the behavior of borrowers as banks can monitor their activities to 
ensure their compliance with the provisions and enforce them if violated. This can 
guarantee the good behavior of borrowers, consequently showing that financial 
intermediation is a better means of channeling funds from SSUs to DSUs than direct 
financing.  
                                                 
11  Stadler (2001, p.11) 
12   Mishkin (2006, p.32) 
13   Details on the calculation and analysis of the ratings are beyond the scope of this paper. 
14   Stadler (2001, p.9)  
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3. Regulation Index to Measure the Quality of Bank Regulations 
15 
The regulation index is composed of an input based regulation index and an output 
based regulation index to help quantify the quality of banking regulations and supervision. 
The input based index consists of criteria that reflect the efforts implemented by 
governments / bank supervisors to achieve an efficient banking system. The output based 
index on the other hand evaluates the outcomes / performance of these efforts. The 
concept of this regulation index is similar to the concept of the cost-benefit analysis 
applied in public finance. The input index resembles the cost signifying the efforts made 
by the governments and supervisors to setting rules and supervising over them. The output 
index resembles the benefit which is basically the performance / outcome of the 
regulations and supervision. Table 1 summarizes the input and output components of the 
index chosen to analyze the quality of bank regulations. These criteria are not exclusive. 
There could be other relevant criteria in this aspect that are not covered in this paper.  
In practice, the criteria of each index will all be assigned equal weights; 20% each 
for the input side and 25% each on the output side. In other situations or further 
applications, the criteria can be assigned different weights but I do not have a strong 
argument to assigning differentiated weights.  
Table 1: Criteria of input and output based indices 
Input-based criteria  Output-based criteria 
1) Regulations to enforce the transparency of banks’ 
operations 
2) Regulations to cut off risky behaviour by banks 
3) Deposit insurance existence and implementation 
4) Criteria for qualifications of bank managers 
5) Criteria for licensing of banks 
1) Amount / Value of deposits 
2) Risk based capital ratio and other banking ratios 
3) Insolvency of banks / bankruptcy 
4) Performance of the banks’ managers in terms of 
profitability and amount of risk taking 
                                                 
15   This index is developed with reference to the study of Neyapti, Dincer (2005)  
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4.1 Input Based Index 
  A brief description of each criterion chosen and its significance in evaluating the 
quality of bank regulations will be explained. Each criterion is further sub-divided to 
several questions that can be answered on a 0/1 scale where 1 indicates the highest 
intensity of regulations and 0 indicates the lowest intensity of regulations. After each input 
based criterion has been broken down into measurable standards, we take an unweighted 
average of the responses of the questions under each criterion leading to 5 indices, one for 
each of the main criteria. We then get a weighted average of these indices based on the 
20% weight for each criterion and finally calculate an aggregate value for the input based 
index. 
1) Regulations to enforce the transparency of banks’ operations 
The first criterion relates to the third pillar of the New Basel Accord
16; Enhanced 
Disclosures. It should be required by all supervisors that commercial banks disclose their 
financial statements. Basically, the balance sheet of a bank is the most important financial 
statement because it reflects the bank’s financial position as it gives information about the 
amount of capital the bank holds as well as its liabilities as opposed to its assets. To 
enhance the accuracy of information, it should be required that the balance sheet is revised 
by an external auditor in accordance with international auditing standards to make sure it 
complies with the international accounting standards and finally, it should be published in 
a national newspaper on an annual basis.  
a) Are banks required to disclose their balance sheet in a national newspaper on annual 
basis or more frequently? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No 
 
                                                 
16   The New Basel Accord was released by the Basel Committee in June 2004 to apply common 
regulatory standards to the banking industries of member countries.  
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b) Is it a requirement that external auditors revise the balance sheet? 
1 – Yes   
0 – No 
c) Is the balance sheet checked for compliance with international accounting standards? 
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No 
d) Is the balance sheet revised in accordance with international auditing standards? 
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No 
2) Regulations to cut off risky behaviour by banks 
  The amount of risks banks take is a critical issue for the stability of the banking 
sector. It is therefore an issue of concern to the depositors, the regulators and the 
government. It is not enough to have regulations and criteria but it is necessary that 
supervisors check that they are complied with and that banks really do implement them. 
This relates to the first and second pillars of Basel II, minimum capital requirements 
(measured by the risk based capital ratio) and supervisory review respectively.  
a) Are there regulations decided by the government / the bank supervisors of a country to 
address the amount of risk banks are allowed to take? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No 
b) If regulations exist, is there supervision that they are being implemented? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No  
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c) Is the minimum reserve requirement
17 stated in the law? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No 
d) Is the liquidity ratio (
its TotalDepos
Bank CashHeldAt ) stated in the law? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No 
3) Deposit insurance existence and implementation 
  The existence of deposit insurance is a very important aspect of a banking system. 
It is considered a safety net that helps maintain the people’s confidence in the banks. 
Explicit deposit insurance is a formal commitment by the deposit insurance institutions 
that allows citizens to know facts about the deposit insurance system in their country in 
terms of who implements it and the extent of coverage they get, i.e. whether they are 
guaranteed 100% of their deposits back or only a portion. With implicit deposit insurance, 
there are no clear cuts. All information depositors have is from observing how failed banks 
were handled / bailed out previously and expecting they will be handled in the same 
manner. Citizens believe that deposit insurance provided by the government is safer than 
that provided by a private institution. 
a) Is there a deposit insurance system in the country? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No 
b) If yes to (a), is it mandatory for all banks to join? I.e. is it a must that banks join the 
deposit insurance system to get a bank license? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No 
                                                 
17   Percentage of bank deposits held at the CB  
- 10 -
c) If yes to (a), is it an explicit or implicit scheme? 
1 – Explicit 
0 – Implicit 
d) If yes to (a), who finances the deposit insurance? 
1 – The government 
0 – Private institutions 
e) If yes to (a), what is the extent of coverage of the deposit insurance? 
1 – Full coverage 
0 – Partial Coverage 
4) Criteria for qualifications of bank managers 
  A main determinant of the performance and the success of a bank is the quality of 
its management. Quality of management is a function of the managers’ professional 
qualifications and ethical standards. The professional dimension can, in the most basic 
sense, be measured in the number of years of experience and the educational background. 
It is also useful to take into consideration some other relevant courses the candidate has 
attended and his/her performance in these courses.
 18  
Unfortunately, ethical standards are difficult to quantify and measure however, a 
candidate can be asked how he or she would react in certain ethical situations and 
conclusions can be drawn from their responses. A person’s history and previous work 
relationships can be scanned to get an idea of his ethical standards as well.  
a) Is the number of years of experience of managers set in the law? 
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No 
                                                 
18  This point aims to infer the candidate’s knowledge about and motivation for his field.  
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b) Are relevant courses attended by candidates and a high performance in these courses 
taken into consideration? 
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No  
c) Are ethical standards considered when appointing the bank’s management?  
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No 
5) Criteria for licensing of banks 
  Granting a bank a licence is a critical decision that should be taken seriously. There 
should be a single authority responsible for granting the license to minimize political 
interference. This authority should have the power to turn down applications that do not 
meet the requirements. It should be able to screen the owners’ and manager’s 
qualifications and ethical standards. The stipulations set should give an indication that the 
licensed bank is in fact up to the standard and will be able to perform well. These 
conditions should address the minimum capital requirements and should forbid industrial 
conglomerates from establishing their own banks to facilitate their access to credit. 
a) Are there specific regulations and criteria for the establishment of a new bank and for 
the merger of banks? 
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No 
b) Who has the authority of licensing a new bank? 
1 – A single authority 
0 – Not clearly defined, there is room for political interference 
c) Are the bank’s owners and managers screened before the license is granted?   
  1 – Yes 
0 – No  
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d) Are there specifications for the minimum capital requirements? 
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No 
e) Are banks checked for having a reasonable business plan and financial projections? 
  1 – Yes 
  0 – No 
f) Are large industrial conglomerates allowed to establish a bank? 
  1 – No 
  0 – Yes or not mentioned in the law 
 
4.2 Output Based Index 
The output based index includes criteria that help evaluate the effectiveness of the 
input based index showing the performance of the regulations and indicating the 
performance of the banking industry. A brief description of the four criteria chosen and the 
significance of each in evaluating the quality of bank regulations will be explained. As 
with the input based index, each criterion is sub-divided to several questions. The 
difference here which makes the output index more complicated is that many of the 
questions are arbitrary meaning that there is a continuous set of answers and are therefore 
not measurable on a 0/1 scale. To deal with this problem, a duration for the application of 
this model has to be specified where the highest/lowest (depending on the criterion) 
observed figure within this duration would be given a value of 1 indicating the best 
performance and the lowest/highest observed figure would be given a value of 0 indicating 
the worst performance. Finally, the year under study can be evaluated based on these 
limits on a 0/1 scale.
 19 After each output based criterion has been broken down into 
                                                 
19   Although this normalization method is informative, its main weakness is that as more years are 
added to the observed duration, the upper and lower limits may change and consequently the scale 
given to the selected year under study will also change.  
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measurable standards, an unweighted average of the responses of the questions under each 
criterion is calculated leading to 4 indices, one for each of the main criteria. We then get a 
weighted average of these indices based on the 25% weight for each criterion and finally 
calculate an aggregate value for the output based index. 
1) Amount / Value of deposits 
If banks are really abiding by the regulations and operating with transparency, 
citizens would have an increased confidence in the banking system. This can be measured 
by the amount of deposits that people leave in the banks relative to GDP. The higher this 
value, the better as a higher amount of deposits signals people’s confidence in the banking 
system. Another useful measure would be the percentage of the population with a bank 
account. However, unfortunately, the information is not available in all countries (it is not 
available in Egypt where the index is applied in the next chapter) and therefore this 
measure will be dropped from this index but I believe, when available, it would be a very 
informative indictor. It would be calculated as 
ation TotalPopul
ccount WithABankA Population . Though less 
informative, this measure can be replaced by dividing the total population over the total 
number of commercial bank branches to indicate the number of citizens each branch 
serves. The lower this figure, the better as it shows the widespread of banks indicating that 
the banking industry is growing.  




   (1) 





2) Risk based capital ratio and other banking ratios 
  Since risk is the main issue of concern to the financial sector and the banking 
system, specific risk measures must exist and must be enforced to guarantee that banks are  
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not taking on excessive risks. The existence and enforcement of these measures were 
analyzed in the input index and their effectiveness is to be measured under this section. 
This issue of risk management has been broadly discussed in The Basel Accords which 
identified a risk based capital ratio that sets the ratio of regulatory capital to risk weighted 
assets. It is necessary to measure whether banks are abiding by such ratios or not. 
According to Basel, the calculation of the risk based capital ratio should be at a minimum 
of 8%. The equity ratio is another informative ratio which shows the ratio of total equity 
(or total capital) to the total assets banks are holding. A more relevant risk measure for the 
banking industry would use total loans and not total assets showing the proportion of loans 
covered by the bank’s own capital. From a risk point of view, the higher the ratio, the 
better because this means that the banks’ loans are backed up with a high level of capital. 
Another measure worth calculating is the provisions for loan losses which is calculated by 
dividing the provisions of banks by the total loans. This ratio gives an indication of the 
amount of risk expected to exist in the current loan portfolio of banks. This means that the 
lower the value of this ratio, the better because lower values indicate lower expectations of 
loan loss i.e. lower risk. The total loans in these two ratios include the loans granted to the 
public and to other banks. Loans to the government are not added since they are 
considered risk free and therefore do not have to be backed up by capital and are not in 
need for provisions in the first place.  
a) Is the risk based capital ratio relative to Basel achieved, i.e. 8%? 
  1 – Yes 






=  (3) 









 (5)  
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3) Insolvency of banks / bankruptcy 
Bank runs and bankruptcies are the biggest threats to banks and therefore, 
preventing bank runs and bankruptcies are top priorities for the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities of banks. The occurrence of bankruptcies can signal a deficiency in the quality 
of regulation and should therefore be considered in this output index. If bankruptcies 
existed, it is most likely to evaluate the deposit insurance system in an economy at the 
time of the bankruptcy and check whether depositors received their insured deposits or 
not. 
a) Were there bankruptcies over the past five years
20? 
  1 – No    
0 – Yes 
b) If yes, did the deposit insurance system pay? 
1 – Yes 
0 – No 
 
4) Performance of the banks’ managers and amount of risk taking 
  A good way to measure if the regulations on the choice of bank managers are of 
high quality is to measure the performance of these managers in several aspects; 
profitability, risk and maturity mismatch. A reasonable measure of profitability is the 
ROE. For the purpose of this study, limiting profits to operating profits instead of total 
profits is a better indication of the manager’s performance.
21 Obviously, the higher the 
ROE, the better because it shows that the bank is able to generate more profits from its 
capital. Measuring the amount of risk incurred can be achieved by calculating the variance 
/ standard deviation of the profits which measure the dispersion / fluctuation of the profits. 
                                                 
20   Five years back from the year under study. This period could be longer but 5 years was the most 
suitable for the purpose of applying to Egypt. 
21   If operating profits are not available, total profits can be used instead.  
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A larger variance / standard deviation signals higher risk because it means that the profits 
are not stable. Another way to evaluate the managers’ performance is to measure how well 
they can handle the maturity mismatch between their assets (loans) and their liabilities 
(deposits) so that they do not fall short on liquidity or become unable to pay back the 
deposits at any given time. 





























The value of this model will become apparent when applied on a cross country or a 
time series study where the input and output indices will be calculated for different 
countries or different years and changes in the figures can be compared. An increase in the 
input based index means that the government / supervisors are dedicating more efforts to 
setting banking regulations and to enforcing them and vice versa. An increase in the output 
based index means that the performance of the banking system is improving and vice 
versa. Expectations are that an increase in the input index is at least matched by an 
increase in the output index. If the input based index is increasing more than the output 
index value, this signals that the costs of regulations are exceeding the benefits gained. If 
the output based index is increasing without having increased the input index (is constant 
or decreasing), this can mean that the efficiency of regulations is increasing (less input 
                                                 
22   Where n is the number of years and x is the average of observed profits.  
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yields higher output) but this questions the reasons and importance of having bank 
regulations at all. 
4. Application of the Quality Index to Egypt 
The last chapter of this paper applies the regulation index described in chapter 4 on 
Egypt in a time series study. Egypt’s banking sector reform in year 2003 adds value to this 
application where year 2002 will be analyzed to resemble before reform and the results 
will be compared to those of year 2007 to resemble after reform. This comparison will 
help identify the change in the intensity of regulation and the performance of the banking 
sector as a result of the reform. The following tables two (input index) and three (output 
index) summarize the results of the calculations
23. 
                                                 
23 Dashes (-) will be used when the question is irrelevant or not applicable  
- 18 -
Table 2: Regulatory Input Index for Egypt (2002 versus 2007) 
  2002 2007 
1) Regulations to enforce transparency     
a) Are banks required to disclose their balance sheet in a national newspaper on annual 
basis or more frequently?  0 1 
b) Is it a requirement that external auditors revise the balance sheet?  1  1 
c) Is the balance sheet checked for compliance with international accounting standards?  0  1 
d) Is the balance sheet revised in accordance to international auditing standards?  1  1 
Total value of index component  0.5  1 
2) Regulations to cut off risky behaviour by banks     
a) Are there regulations decided by the government / the bank supervisors of a country 
to address the amount of risk banks are allowed to take?  1 1 
b) If regulations exist, is there supervision that they are being implemented?  1  1 
c) Is the minimum reserve ratio stated in the law?  1  1 
d) Is the liquidity ratio stated in the law?  1  1 
Total value of index component  1  1 
3) Deposit insurance existence and implementation     
a) Is there a deposit insurance system in the country?  0  0 
b) If yes to (a), is it mandatory for all banks to join? I.e. is it a must that banks join the 
deposit insurance system to get a bank license?  - - 
c) If yes to (a), is it an explicit or implicit scheme?  -  - 
d) If yes to (a), who is the provider of deposit insurance?  -  - 
e) If yes to (a), what is the extent of coverage of the deposit insurance?  -  - 
Total value of index component  0  0 
4) Criteria for qualifications of bank managers     
a) Is the number of years of experience of managers set in the law?  1  0 
b) Are relevant courses attended by candidates and a high performance in these courses 
taken into consideration?  0 0 
c) Are ethical standards considered when appointing the bank’s management?   1  1 
Total value of index component  0.67  0.33 
5) Criteria for licensing of banks     
a) Are there specific regulations and criteria for the establishment of a new bank or for 
the merger of banks?  1 1 
b) Who has the authority of licensing a new bank?  1  1 
c) Are the bank’s owners and managers screened before the license is granted?  1  1 
d) Are there specifications for the minimum capital requirements?  1  1 
e) Are banks checked for having a reasonable business plan and financial projections?  1  1 
f) Are large industrial conglomerates allowed to establish a bank?  0  0 
Total value of index component  0.83  0.83 
Total value of input index (weighted average of index components)  0.6  0.632  
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Table 3: Regulatory Output Index for Egypt (2002 versus 2007) 
  2002 2007 
1) Amount / Value of deposits     
a) Deposits as a percentage of GDP  0.71  1 
b) Number of citizens served by each commercial bank branch  0.028  1 
Total value of index component  0.37  1 
2) Risk based capital ratio and other banking ratios     
a) Is the risk based output relative to Basel achieved, i.e. 8%?  1  1 
b) Equity Ratio  0  0.74 
c) Provisions for loan losses  0.31  1 
Total value of index component  0.437  0.913 
3) Insolvency of banks / bankruptcy     
a) Were there bankruptcies in Egypt over the past five years? 
1 – No 
0 – Yes 
0 1 
b) If yes, did the deposit insurance system pay?  -  - 
Total value of index component  0  1 
4) Performance of the banks’ managers and amount of risk taking     
a) ROE (Profitability)
24 0  1 
b) Variance / standard deviation of profits
25 0  1 
Total value of index component  0  1 
Total value of output index (weighted average of index components)  0.2 0.98 
 
By observing the results obtained from applying the index on Egypt, it is clear that 
the input index increased only slightly from 0.6 in 2002 to 0.632 in 2007. This means that 
there is actually a minor increase in the intensity of regulations. This result is to some 
degree unexpected as it was believed that the intensity of regulations became much higher 
with the banking reform in 2003. However, the output index has impressively leaped from 
0.2 in 2002 to 0.98 in 2007. This is a clear sign of the improvement of the performance of 
the banking sector after the reform.  
                                                 
24  With reference to Table 8 and Table 9 in the Appendix concerning the calculation of the ROE, the 
period with the lower average ROE (1998 to 2002) gets a Zero and the period with the higher 
average ROE (2003 to 2007) gets a value of 1. 
25   With reference to Table 10 and Table 11 in the Appendix concerning the calculation of the variance 
and standard deviation, the period with the higher Variance and standard deviation (1998 to 2002) 
gets a Zero and the period with the lower variance and standard deviation (2003 to 2007) gets a 
value of 1.  
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Looking at the results from another perspective, it becomes obvious that the 
efficiency of regulations has become so much higher. In 2002, the input index was 0.6 
with a corresponding output of 0.2. On the other hand, in 2007, the input index was 0.632 
and it yielded an output index of 0.98. This shows that with almost the same intensity of 
regulations, a much higher performance can be achieved and this only means that the input 
regulations have become more efficient. This can possibly be attributed to the fact that the 
banking reform was part of the more general successful economic reform. Other programs 
of this economic reform that have actually been implemented were the tax system reform, 
increased privatization and the settlement of the QIZ agreement. These programs raised 
the government’s credibility and proved to the whole world, and most importantly to the 
citizens, that the government was serious and committed to its reform. The citizens 
consequently expected similar improvements in the banking industry and so, the 
investment climate in Egypt became more attractive and banking sector improved 
significantly.  
These interesting results are also alarming! The CBE should take into 
consideration that the higher efficiency of the input index may not be sustainable in the 
medium or in the long run. It has to consider working on the inputs more. The deposit 
insurance is a clear weakness point. Establishing the "Deposit Insurance Fund at Banks" 
should be a priority now. Strengthening the input index will be the key to sustaining a high 




This paper has studied commercial banks; their roles and their importance to 
having a healthy financial system that can consequently lead to economic growth. It has 
focused on the regulation and supervision of commercial banks because they are the 
largest, most important and most diversified of all financial intermediaries. And especially 
with the current financial crisis, regulation is becoming an increasingly important issue. 
More research should be dedicated to regulation and supervision to prevent such turmoil 
from reoccurrence.  
Measuring the quality of banking regulation is generally difficult because it is a 
qualitative analysis and is arbitrary. In an attempt to measure the quality of bank 
regulations, a regulation index has been modelled comprising an input regulation index 
that measures the intensity of the regulations set by the government / supervisors and 
compares it to an output regulation index that measures the performance of the banking 
system. It is important to note that this index makes more sense when implemented on a 
time series analysis comparing the intensity of regulations with bank performance over the 
years as the application to Egypt showed. It can also be very valuable in comparing 
between the banking systems of several countries. 
Finally, an application to Egypt resembling a developing country was performed. 
Egypt’s case is especially interesting as it has undergone a serious economic and banking 
reform in 2003; therefore, the regulation index has been applied to Egypt to compare a 
year before the reform (2002) to a year after the reform (2007).  
This paper concludes that regulation is an indispensable aspect of having a healthy 
banking system, financial sector and a growing economy. Egypt's results show that it is 
doing well but more focus is needed in the input area to make regulations more intense so 
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Table 4: Deposits and GDP between 1998 and 2007 
Year  Deposits in Millions  GDP in Millions  Percentage of Deposits to GDP 
1998 142738  266757.7  53.51% 
1999 161162  282578.0  57.00% 
2000 172298  315667.0  54.58% 
2001 185968  332543.8  55.92% 
2002 210224  354563.8  59.29% 
2003 230964  390619.4  59.13% 
2004 255283  456322.4  55.94% 
2005 309676  506511  61.14% 
2006 349223  581144.1  60.09% 
2007 421854  684429.8  61.64% 
Source for deposits: 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/TimeSeries/Banking%20Survey/2-Deposits%20in%20Local%20Currency.xls 
Source for GDP: 
Ministry of Planning, http://www.mop.gov.eg/English/GDP.htm 
 
Table 5: Population & number of commercial bank branches between 2002 & 2007 
Year  Population 
in millions 
Number of commercial bank branches 
(excluding off shore banks) 
Number of citizens per 
commercial bank branch 
1998 60.7  1220  49754 
1999 62.0  1241  49960 
2000 63.3  1253  50519 
2001 64.7  1288  50233 
2002 66.0  1294  51005 
2003 67.3  1300  51769 
2004 68.6  2724  25184 
2005 70.0  2792  25072 
2006 71.3  2896  24620 
2007 72.7  3004  24201 
Note: Population of 2007 calculated based on 0.02% growth rate. 
Source for population: 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/TimeSeries/Population,Labour%20force&%20Unemployment%20Rate.xls 
Source for number of branches: 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/TimeSeries/structure%20of%20the%20Egyptian%20%20Banking%20System.xls  
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Table 6: Equity Ratio 
Year  Total Equity / Total Capital  Total Loans
26 Equity  Ratio 
1998 10566  240107  4.4% 
1999 11373  265336  4.29% 
2000 11764  293952  4.0% 
2001 12038  324769  3.71% 
2002 12531  369346  3.39% 
2003 18155  425394  4.27% 
2004 20346  455779  4.46% 
2005 22949  484385  4.74% 
2006 27112  518290  5.23% 
2007 33037  695475  4.75% 
Source for total capital and total loans: 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/TimeSeries/Banks/1-Aggregate%20Balance%20Sheet.xls 
 
Table 7: Provisions for loan losses 
Year  Provisions in millions  Total loans in millions  Percentage of provisions to loans 
1998 23392  240107  9.74% 
1999 25984  265336  9.79% 
2000 27554  293952  9.37% 
2001 31200  324769  9.61% 
2002 35869  369346  9.71% 
2003 40099  425394  9.43% 
2004 44584  455779  9.78% 
2005 49541  484385  10.23% 
2006 54950  518290  10.6% 
2007 53469  695475  7.69% 
Source for provisions and total loans
27: 
http://www.cbe.org.eg/TimeSeries/Banks/1-Aggregate%20Balance%20Sheet.xls 
                                                 
26 Calculations of total loans= balances with banks in Egypt + balances with banks abroad + loans and 
discounts. The securities and investments have not been included since they are considered risk free 
loans to the government and do not need to be backed by the bank's capital. 
27 Calculations of total loans= balances with banks in Egypt + balances with banks abroad + loans and 
discounts. The securities and investments have not been included since they are considered risk free 
loans to the government.  
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Sources for ROE available in the annual reports published by the CBE dated 02/03, 03/04, 04/05, 05/06 and 
06/07. http://www.cbe.org.eg/publications.htm 









Table 10: Variance/ Standard Deviation of Profits in the first period (1998 to 2002) 
Year ROE  (xi)  Average ROE ( x ) (xi -  x ) (xi -  x )
2 
2001 12.35%  10.625%  1.725%  0.000297563 
2002 8.90%  10.625%  -1.725%  0.000297563 
       Σ= 0.000595125 
Standard Deviation = 0.0243 
Table 11: Variance of Profitability in the second period (2003 to 2007) 
Year ROE  (xi)  Average ROE ( x ) (xi -  x ) (xi -  x )
2 
2003 10.2%  12.0625%  -1.8625%  0.0003469 
2004 11%  12.0625%  -1.0625%  0.0001129 
2005 13%  12.0625%  0.9375%  0.0000879 
2006 14.05%  12.0625%  1.9875%  0.0003950 
       Σ = 0.0009427 
Standard Deviation = 0.018 
                                                 
28 Information on ROE was not available for years 1998, 1999 and 2000 so the calculation of the first period 
is limited to 2001 and 2002. 
29 Information on ROE was not available for the year 2007 so the calculation of the second period is limited 
to 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. 